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ABSTRACT
This study empirically examines the impact of international monetary policy on bank
risk in the Indian context. Using annual data from 64 banks and employing panel OLS
and GMM techniques, this study finds that: (1) a contractionary international monetary
policy increases bank risk; (2) an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate induces
bank riskiness; (3) the domestic monetary policy affects bank risk through the “search
for yield” channel; and (4) the international monetary policy is relatively significant in
explaining the bank riskiness in the post-global financial crisis period.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the impact of international monetary policy on the bank
risk.1 The higher liquidity due to the prolonged low interest rate in the advanced
economies prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), induced the commercial banks
to involve in risky lending activities and which subsequently created instability in
the financial system (Colletaz et al., 2018). This risk-taking behavior of commercial
banks was considered as one of the key reasons for the culmination of the GFC. As
a healthy banking system is one of the prerequisites for economic stability, when a
bank is fragile, the entire financial system becomes risky due to its integration with
other banks (French et al., 2015). Specifically, contagion and interconnectedness
transform bank risk into systemic risk (Kabundi and De Simone, 2019). Further,
the notion that “riskier banks contribute more to systemic risk” emphasized the
significant collective role of individual sound financial institutions in building a
stable financial system (Tchikand and Tatiana, 2016). Thus, information related to
riskiness of the banks operate in the economy is critical in the policy perspective
to maintain financial stability. It is argued that in a financially integrated world,
the international monetary policies often induce commercial banks to engage in
risky activities (Bruno and Shin, 2015a, 2015b). In other words, the shocks pertain
to the monetary policies of the developed economies transmit to other integrated
economies or peripheral economies, which subsequently results in fluctuations in
the economic activities of later economies (Kearns et al., 2018). Thus, the monetary
policy of advanced economies often affects the credit lending behavior of the banks
in the integrated economies (Borio and Zhu, 2012). Therefore, it is indispensable to
understand the nature of the responses of the domestic banks to the international
monetary policies to frame appropriate domestic policies to safeguard the economy
from such international monetary policy spillover.
Theoretically, the impact of global monetary policy on bank risk is explained
through the risk-taking channel and portfolio rebalancing channel. The risk-taking
behavior is explained through various behavioral models such as search for yields
and exchange rates.2 As per risk-taking channel, an expansionary global monetary
policy leads to a reduction in the global interest rate and which subsequently
increase in lending activities of the banks’ in the peripheral economies and thereby
involved in risk-taking activities (Bruno and Shin, 2015a, 2015b; Morais et al., 2019).
1
2

International monetary policy and foreign monetary policy are used interchangeably in the text.
In the domestic context, a reduction in the policy rate leads to an increase in lending and a
subsequent surge in economic activities (Kashyap et al., 1993; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke
et al., 2005). This genus of modulation in lending can alter the economy’s stability, which is evident
in banks’ risk-taking behavior (Rajan, 2005; Jiménez et al., 2013, 2014; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014). Due
to an expansionary monetary policy, banks are exposed to riskiness on both the asset and liability
side. Banks’ search for yield behavior increases the proportion of risky assets on the asset side
(Rajan, 2006). This will induced them to use more short-term funding (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Stein,
2012), which impacts the liability side. Thus an improvement in the valuation followed by low
interest rate stimulate riskiness (Adrian and Shin, 2010). Similarly, an increase in the price level
due to the expansionary monetary policy simultaneously increases the collateral values and reduces
the borrowing constraints. In such a context, banks substitute safer assets with risker assets and
ultimately increase the risk of bank portfolios (Colletaz et al., 2018). Thus in general, along with
the quantity of credit, monetary policy also affects the quality of credit, which is a crucial factor
influencing the economy’s stability.
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The higher lending takes place through searching a higher yield or interest rate
by the banks in the peripheral economies (Morais et al., 2019). Further, increased
global capital inflows due to lower global interest rate leads to the appreciation of
the domestic currency, which in turn reduces the foreign currency liability of the
commercial banks and thus leads to higher risk-taking (Bruno and Shin, 2015a,
2015b). However, the lower global interest rate can lead to an increase in the bank
stability or reduces the level of risk due to higher availability of funds and lower
foreign currency liability (Durdu and Zhong, 2019). In contrast to this preposition,
the portfolio rebalancing channel states an expansionary global monetary policy
reduces the availability of funds in peripheral economies. This is because of the
lower global interest rate increases the net worth and collateral values of the global
borrowers and thus become creditworthy (Correa et al., 2018; Buch et al., 2019;
Hills et al., 2019).
While analyzing the existing literature, there are a plethora of studies
which focussed on the impact of global monetary policy on the macroeconomic
fundamentals of the integrated economies such as output, interest rate, value
of currency, capital flows, global uncertainty, and equity prices (Bluedorn and
Bowdler, 2011; Chinn, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2015a; Feldkircher and Huber, 2016;
Kiendrebeogo, 2016; Tillmann, 2016; Dedola et al., 2017; Tong, 2017; Curcuru et al.,
2018; Ganelli and Tawk, 2019; Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019; Pham and Nguyen,
2019; Degasperi et al., 2020; Ilzetzki and Jin, 2021). However, in the context of global
monetary policy and bank risk, we could review only few studies. For instance,
the evidence suggests that global monetary policy leads to higher risk-taking in
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) (Bruno and Shin, 2015a, 2015b; Morais et al.,
2019; Albrizio et al., 2020). Similarly, in the context of level of bank risk and its
stability, Cecchetti et al. (2017, 2020) and Tong (2017) find that the expansionary
monetary policy in the United States (US) leads to bank riskiness in other advanced
and EMEs. However, Hussain et al. (2020) find that a lower global interest rate
increases bank stability in China. Whereas, Barroso et al. (2016) found a weak
impact of foreign monetary policy on bank risk in Brazil. Even though, all these
studies focus on the global monetary policy from banking sector perspective, these
studies failed to have an unblemished concise on the impact of global monetary
policy on the periphery economy banking stability. Similarly, none of the studies
provide a clear implication of international monetary policy on bank riskiness in
EMEs, and address the channels through which the international monetary policy
affects the bank risk, or compared the relative importance of various channels
through which bank risk-taking occurs. Apart from this, it is evident from the
country-specific studies that there is a possibility of heterogeneous impact of
international monetary policy on bank risk-taking across the economies. Thus,
there is a need for country specific study to understand the heterogeneous impact
of international monetary policy on bank risk as compared to the existing panel
studies such as (Bruno and Shin, 2015a, 2015b; Cecchetti et al., 2017; Tong, 2017;
Albrizio et al., 2020; Cecchetti et al., 2020).
Finally, it is also important to know whether there is any change in the channels
of risk-taking in the period of the post-GFC, during which many advanced
economies aggressively followed expansionary monetary policies. Thus, this
study fills the above gaps by addressing the following research questions: (1)
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022

3

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 2 [2022], Art. 1
138

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 25, Number 2, 2022

Does the international monetary policy affects the bank risk? (2) If yes, which are
the key channels through the transmission take-place? (3) Did the GFC alter the
transmission channels of bank-risk taking?
We address above research questions by considering the case of India, which
is one of the leading EMEs3 in the world. The following approaches are adopted in
this paper to address the above research questions. (1) We measure the riskiness of
commercial banks using Z-score; (2) We estimate an empirical model of bank risk
using panel framework, by including a proxy for international monetary policy,
and tested various channels of risk-taking; (3) We estimate bank risk for pre- and
post-GFC to examine the role of GFC. (4) Finally, we employ dynamic Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) to check the robustness of the results.
Our empirical findings show that: (1) a significant impact of foreign monetary
policy on bank risk in India; (2) an expansionary global monetary policy leads
to a decrease in bank risk in India, which invalidates the risk-taking channel;
(3) the domestic monetary policy affects through ‘search for yield’ channel; (4)
exchange rate channel plays an important role in bank riskiness, i.e., appreciation
of the domestic currency significantly increases the bank risk; and finally, (5) the
international monetary policy has a significant effect on bank risk during the postGFC compared to the pre-crisis period.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First,
this is one of the first attempts to empirically analyze the various theoretical
channels of risk-taking in the context of international monetary policy. Second,
this study compares the differential impact of foreign monetary policy on bank
risk-taking during the pre and post-crisis period. Third, the present study is the
first attempt to address the impact of international monetary policy on banks’
risk-taking behavior in the Indian context. Fourth, our empirical findings of the
role of global monetary policy and exchange rate in banking sector risk have
important implications in the policy making of EMEs. Finally, our findings based
on country specific analysis uncover various dynamics of bank risk in the presence
of international monetary policy.
This paper is organized in the following manner. Section II summarizes the
extant literature while Section III specifies the empirical model. Section IV explains
the data while Section V discusses the empirical findings. Finally, Section VI
concludes this study.

3

We consider India for this analysis due to several reason. India is one of the fastest growing emerging
market economy which started liberalising its economy form early nineties onwards for better
stability and growth. The financial sector contributed to the growth of the economy significantly.
The banking sector have more than 60 per cent of the total assets of the Indian financial system
and banks are the major source of credit in the economy (RBI, 2009). The domestic credit provided
by Indian banks as a percentage of GDP is increased from 22.5% in 1995 to 52.4% in 2013 (World
Development Indicators). In this scenario, perceived domestic macroeconomic and global risk is a
concern for the stability of banking sector in India (RBI, 2015). Thus analysing the stability and risk
structure of the Indian banks are essential for maintaining financial stability.
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II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE
In the literature, banks’ risk-taking behavior is predominantly explained by
searching for yield and exchange rate channels (Brunnermeier, 2001; Rajan, 2006;
Kearns and Patel, 2016; Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2017). As per the
search for yield channel, a reduction in interest rate reduces the banks’ profit.
Thus, commercial banks involve in risky investments to search for higher yields
(Brunnermeier, 2001; Rajan, 2006). It is also argued that in order to retain the
incentives and bonuses, the managers of the banks often divert lending to the risker
avenues when the policy rate is low. Whereas, the exchange rate channel states a
decrease in global policy rate leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency,
which leads to risk-taking by the banks through increasing leverage (Bruno and
Shin, 2015a, 2015b). In other words, when a home currency appreciates, its value
of foreign denominated liabilities falls in terms of domestic currency as compared
to the assets side, which increases the net worth of the bank as a borrower and
which subsequently increases leverage and risk-taking behavior (Hofmann et al.,
2016; Agarwal, 2019). Supportive to financial channel, Kearns and Patel (2016)
argued that banks’ credit quality is sensitive to exchange rate variations, especially
when the banks hold high level of foreign currency-denominated debt. Further,
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018) found higher risk-taking by firms with higher foreign
currency debt and compared to the tradable sector, the non-tradable sector has
a higher impact. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) studied the exchange
rate’s role in risk-taking and stated that the exchange rate could impact the bank
credit through the agent’s balance sheet.4
The empirical studies also show that the past policies generate moral hazards
and simultaneously impact risk-taking (Gennaioli et al., 2015; Thakor, 2015). The
prolonged low interest rate and bailout packages of governments also encourage
the banks to involve in risk-taking activities (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Farhi
and Tirole, 2012; Chodorow-Reich, 2014). The risk-taking behavior of banks
during low interest rates is found in the case of Bolivia (Ioannidou et al., 2015),
Vietnam (Ha and Quyen, 2018), and Portugal (Bonfim and Soares, 2018). However,
in the context of Vietnam, Dang (2020) finds no evidence of policy rate on risktaking. Interestingly, Paligorova and Santos (2017) found that banks charge a
lower risk premium on risky borrowers during easy monetary policy conditions
as compared to tight monetary policy conditions in the US context. Along with the
policy variables, the macroeconomic variables such as output, inflation, country’s
openness to the international market, and the exchange rate also affect risk-taking
behavior of the banks. For instance, a higher GDP growth rate reduces bank risk
(Jiménez et al., 2014; Ramayandi et al., 2014), and higher inflation leads to a rise
in the value collateral and increases the stability of banks (Wang and Luo, 2019).
On the other hand, country’s openness increases competition among banks and
reduces profitability, which encourages risk-taking (Luo et al., 2016; Bui and Bui,
2020). However, openness may reduce the bank risk through market discipline
4

When a country experiences depreciation of the exchange rate due to the expansionary monetary
policy. If the market agents possess foreign currency-denominated debt in their balance sheet, the
depreciation of the exchange rate leads to increase the debt burden. This increased liability makes
the borrower riskier, and banks will reduce lending in the economy and become risky.
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(Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Klomp and De Haan, 2014; Bui and Bui, 2020). Apart
from the above macroeconomic factors, the bank size also determines the risktaking behavior of the banks. For instance, Bourgain et al. (2012), Tchikand and
Tatiana (2016), and Geng et al. (2016) find that banks with larger sizes are associated
with relatively higher risk-taking. Contrarily, Hussain et al. (2020) find bank size
does not significantly affect the risk-taking channel in the Chinese banking sector.
In sum, from the above discussion of literature we find that focus of the
literature on the impact of global monetary policy especially on risk taking is
gaining attention in the recent years, and there is a lack of concise in the impact
global monetary policy on the bank risk in EMEs. Apart from this lack of concise,
there exists differential impact in the individual country based studies which
demand further in depth exploration. Thus, our study fills this research gap and
contributes to the present literature as discussed in the introduction section. We
summarise the findings of relevant literature in Appendix A.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
To test the impact of international monetary policy on bank risk, we estimate the
following regression model:
(1)
where the dependent variable Riskit denotes bank risk. Whereas it* and it denote
global and domestic interest rates, respectively. Similarly, ert, yt, Inflat, Asstit
denotes exchange rate, domestic output, inflation, and bank’s assets, respectively.
The subscript i stands for banks; t denotes time; β0 is the intercept; β1, β2, β3, β4, β5,
and β6 are the parameters to be estimated; and ϵit stands for the error term.
The dependent variable Riskit measures the level of risk of the banks and is
proxied using the Z-Score. A high Z-score implies lower the risk or higher the
stability, and a low value Z-score implies higher the risk and lower the stability
of bank. The impact of global monetary policy (i*) on bank risk can be positive
or negative. A positive effect implies that if an expansionary global monetary
policy (a decline in i*) results in an increase in lending and thereby increase in the
risk indicates the presence of international bank lending channel (Morais et al.,
2019). The impact is negative, when the banks rebalance by shifting their lending
from domestic to global investors whose creditworthiness is improved due to the
reduction global interest rate, then it can reduce the risk-taking activities of the
banks in the home economies and thereby increase the bank’s stability (Correa et
al., 2018). In sum, if the international bank lending channel persists, then we expect
a positive relationship between i* and Risk (β1>0), whereas if portfolio rebalancing
channel exists, the relationship is expected to be negative (β1<0).
The variable i is expected to have a positive effect on the risk of the banks as
increase in domestic interest rate leads to a decrease in risk (β2 > 0). In other words,
a reduction in the domestic policy rate increases the risk-taking through search
for yield, and decreases the stability (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Borio and Zhu,
2012; Wu et al., 2017). Similarly, the er is expected to have a negative relationship
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/1
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with the Z-score as an increase (appreciation) of the exchange rate leads to higher
leverage and risk-taking (β3 < 0). Likewise, y is expected to have a positive effect
on Z-score, i.e. β4 > 0, as better economic conditions raise the profitability of banks
due to higher demand for credit (Kashyap et al., 1993; Ramayandi et al., 2014; Wu
et al., 2017).
The variable, Infla, can affect the Z-score positively or negatively. If inflation
leads to an increase in nominal interest rates then it can increase stability (β5 >
0). However, if inflation increases the cost of borrowing, thereby increasing the
default risks, then it can lead to a decrease in stability, i.e., β5 < 0 (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga, 2010; De Nicolò et al., 2010; Angori et al., 2019). Finally, the variable,
Asst, is expected to have a negative relationship with the Z-score as a larger size
has a stronger motivation to engage in risky activities, leading to greater risk,
hence β6 < 0 (Geng et al., 2016).
We conduct the empirical analysis using the following steps. First, we estimate
Equation (1) using panel data regression. Based on the Hausman test result, we
select the appropriate model for interpretation of findings, i.e., whether it is fixed
or random effect model. Second, we estimate Equation (1) using data for the preand post-GFC period. Finally, we use the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)
method to ensure the dynamic relationship between the variables are robust.5
IV. DATA AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
A. Data
We utilize the annual data from 1999 to 2017.6 The total sample consists of 64 banks,
which includes nationalized banks, private sector banks, foreign banks, and the
State Bank of India and its associates. The remaining variables are obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louise, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Bank
of International Settlements (BIS), World Bank, and CEIC databases. A detailed
description of the calculation of Z-score is explained below.
B. Variable Measurement
We measure the bank risk by calculating Z-score following (Laeven and Levine,
2009; Houston et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2017; Danisman and Demirel,
2019). Z-score is an accounting-based risk measure which capture the balancesheet vulnerability and includes both credit risk and market risk and thus
represents the bank-risk taking (Brandao-Marques et al., 2013; Brana et al., 2019)
and measure overall risk of the bank (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Wu et
al., 2017; Hussain et al., 2020). Larger values for the Z-score imply lower risk-taking
and, thus, greater bank stability. In general, this measure reflects the probability
of a bank’s insolvency risk based on the amount of buffer the bank must guard
against shocks to earnings (Luo et al., 2016). The Z-score is formally expressed as:
5

6

We do not describe these methods in the text due to space restrictions. Please refer Hansen (1982) for
GMM.
We limit the data till 2017 to incorporate the maximum number of banks into the analysis. After1st
April 2017, the number of banks operating in India has declined due to merging activities of the State
Bank of India (SBI) (one of the leading banks in the country) with other state-run banks.
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(2)
where i and t represent bank and time, respectively, Zit represents the Z-Score;
RoAit denotes the return on asset; EARit represents the equity to asset ratio; the
denominator σ(RoA)it means the standard deviation of return on asset.
Similarly, the variable global interest rate is proxied by the US federal fund
rate7 and domestic interest rate is proxied by weighted average call money rate.
Exchange rate, output, and inflation are proxied by nominal effective exchange
rate, growth rate of real GDP, and CPI based inflation rate, respectively. Likewise,
the size of the bank is proxied by the banks’ assets. Exchange rate and assets are
measured in log form. Further details on data are provided in Table 1.
Table 1.
Details of Variables and Data Source
This table presents the variables description, expected sign based on the previous studies, and their sources.

Variable
Z-Score

Description

Expected Sign

Log of Z-Score.

Source

i*

Federal fund rate of the US

+/-

i
er
y

Weighted average call money rate.
Log of the NEER.
Growth rate of real GDP of India.
Inflation based on consumer price
index.
Assets of the banks in log form.

+
+

Authors calculation
Federal reserve bank
of St. Louise
RBI
BIS
IMF

+/-

WDI

+/-

CEIC

Infla
Asst

V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We present the descriptive statistics in Table 2. We also check the multicollinearity
among the variables through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and report these
results in Table 3. Our tabulated results confirm the absence of multicollinearity
among the variables where the maximum value of VIF is 2.677. Since the VIF value
is much lower than the benchmark of 10, we proceed with further analysis.

7

Being the world’s largest economy, the US influence the global economic activities. Specifically,
US monetary policy significantly impact the global variables (Rey, 2016). Supportively, Cerutti and
Osorio-Buitron (2020). confirmed that US monetary policy plays more global role compared to Euro
area monetary policy. Thus, following Takáts and Vela (2014), Hausman and Wongswan (2011) and
Barroso et al. (2016), we use the US monetary policy as the proxy for global policy rate.
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Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables used in this study, which includes Z-score, federal fund rate (i*),
weighted average call money rate (i), exchange rate (er), output (y), inflation (Infla), and assets (Asst). Our data spans
the period 1999 to 2017.

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Z-Score
i*
i
er
y
Infla
Asst

1216
1216
1216
1216
1216
1216
1216

2.672
1.930
6.805
4.587
7.226
6.353
11.797

0.619
2.040
1.527
0.171
1.955
2.776
2.392

-1.136
0.089
3.290
4.316
3.900
2.491
5.706

4.233
6.236
9.150
4.796
10.300
11.989
17.114

Table 3.
Correlation Table and Variance Inflation Factor Values
This table presents the correlation and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of variables used in this study. Variable details
are provided in Table 1. VIF implies the mean VIF values of all variables.

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1) Z-Score
(2) i*
(3) i
(4) er
(5) y
(6) Infla
(7) Asst
VIF

1.000
-0.124
0.037
-0.112
0.053
0.072
0.009
1.628

1.000
0.189
0.731
-0.036
-0.136
-0.266
2.648

1.000
-0.077
-0.130
-0.022
0.031
1.194

1.000
-0.095
0.032
-0.348
2.677

1.000
-0.067
0.058
1.044

1.000
0.028
1.068

1.000
1.141

Table 4 reports results obtained from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed
Effect (FE), and Random Effect (RE) models. Among these models, the FE model
is chosen over the random effect model based on the Hausman test results. The
findings from the FE model shows a significant and inverse relationship between
the global interest rate (i*) and the Z-score, which implies a decrease in global
interest rate leads to an increase in bank stability. This can be due to the higher
availability of funds with the banks which in turn improve the balance sheet of the
banks. This finding invalidate the international risk-taking channel in the Indian
context as the risk of the banks not increased due to lower global interest rate. This
can be attributed to the stringent lending norms in India, which does not induce
the banks to involve in risk-taking activities in the presence of higher liquidity.
Further, the existence of a positive interest rate differential between India and
global rates induces the capital inflow which strengthen the banks (Verma and
Prakash, 2011). Further, the low risk taking in India may be attributed to portfolio
rebalancing activities by banks, as a rise in the global policy rate increases the risk
of lending in foreign economies8 as the global banks reallocate credit to relatively
8

Due to a decrease in the net worth and collateral values of the borrowers in the centre economy.
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safer borrowers in foreign economies. A similar finding is reported by Correa et al.
(2018), Choi and Furceri (2019), and Auer et al. (2019) in the EME context. Similarly,
Shareef and Prabheesh (2020) find evidence of portfolio rebalancing channel while
analyzing the impact of international monetary policy on foreign bank credit in
India.
Table 4.
Results Based on Fixed and Random Effect Models
This table presents results of fixed and random effect models employed in this study. The dependent variable is
the riskiness of banks proxied with Z-Scoreit. The last rows of the table report constant, adjusted R2, F-statistic, and
Hausman test result, and the number of observations considered for analysis, respectively. The standard error is
reported in the parenthesis except for Hausman test where values in the parenthesis represent the probability value.
Lastly, ** and *** denotes the statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Variables
i*
i
er
y
Infla
Asst
Constant
Adj R2
F-stat
Hausman test
Observations

(1)
OLS

(2)
FE

(3)
RE

-0.033**
(0.014)
0.026**
(0.013)
-0.139
(0.168)
0.019**
(0.009)
0.016**
(0.007)
-0.010
(0.008)
3.370***
(0.785)
0.023
5.696

-0.037***
(0.007)
0.030***
(0.007)
-0.995***
(0.126)
0.026***
(0.005)
0.022***
(0.004)
-0.196***
(0.020)
9.444***
(0.765)
0.106
35.400
30.259
(0.000)
1216

-0.036***
(0.007)
0.029***
(0.007)
-0.718***
(0.117)
0.024***
(0.005)
0.020***
(0.004)
-0.136***
(0.017)
7.479***
(0.683)

1216

1216

Table 4 also shows that the variable domestic policy rate (i) is positive and
statistically significant in explaining Z-score, which implies that an increase in the
domestic policy rate increases the bank stability. In other words, a reduction in
domestic policy rate leads to a reduction in stability of banks as banks lend more
and taking more risk to maintain their normal profit during low-policy rate. This
finding support the “search for yield” behaviour of banks (Rajan, 2005). Our result
is also in line with the findings of Geng et al. (2016) and Sarkar and Sensarma
(2019) in the Indian context.
Similarly, the er exhibits a negative and statistically significant relationship
with Z- score, implying an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate increases
the banking sector risk. This can be attributed to the higher lending activities of the
commercial banks in India during the period of exchange rate appreciation. When
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exchange rate appreciates, the overall liability of the banks decreases, which in
turn induce the banks in involving risk-taking activities. Our result is in line with
the risk-taking channel of the exchange rate in the banking system (Kearns and
Patel, 2016; Sehgal and Agrawal, 2017; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2018; Agarwal, 2019).
The impact of the y on stability is statistically significant and positive as expected.
Thus, an increase in the level of income in the economy leads to a reduction in
bank risk-taking. This relationship supports the argument that an increase in the
GDP implies a rise in the income and subsequent increase in the repayment ability
of the borrowers which result in the reduction of default risk of the overall banking
sector in the economy (Kumar et al., 2018). The variable Infla is also found to have
a positive effect on Z-score, which implies when the inflation increases, the bank
stability also increases, or riskiness decreases due to increase in the net worth.
These results align with the findings of Gulati et al. (2019) in the Indian context.
Exploring the impact of the Asst on their risk-taking, we find a statistically
significant and negative relationship between the size of the banks and their risktaking. Specifically, larger banks are characterized by higher risk-taking. This
finding contradicts the argument of large banks’ ability to portfolio diversification
and economies of scale, reducing their risk exposure (Abedifar et al., 2013; Tan,
2016). At the same time, our finding aligns with Brana et al. (2019), which supports
that those larger institutions and banks’ concentration ultimately reflect risk-taking
in Europe. Similarly, De Nicolò et al. (2010) provided evidence that a reduction
in the policy rate leads to higher risk-taking by the highly capitalized banks in
comparison to the low capitalized banks and also support the argument of Sehgal
and Agrawal (2017) that large-sized banks in India are more exposed to equity
risk.
Table 5 reports the findings from sub-sample analysis, i.e., the pre- and postGFC, 2008. It can be observed that during the pre-GFC, the impact of the global
interest rate is not significant on Z-score. Whereas during the post-GFC, the impact
is negative and statistically significant, implying a reduction in global interest rate
decrease the bank risk. These findings clearly reveal that the risk-taking behavior
of the banks has been altered by the GFC. The decrease in risk-taking behavior
of the banks during the post-GFC can be attributed to the reduction in the global
interest rate and increased global liquidity due to the expansionary monetary
policies of the advanced economies. This significant negative relationship during
post-GFC period can be attributed to the flight to quality concern where, an
expansionary foreign monetary policy leads to rebalancing towards the less risky
global borrowers and simultaneous increase in the global liquidity.
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Table 5.
Pre and Post-crisis Based Results
This table reports results of fixed and random effect models using two sub-sample periods: pre-crisis (1999-2007)
and post-crisis (2008-2017) periods. The dependent variable is the Z-Scoreit. The last rows of the table report constant,
adjusted R2, F-statistic, Hausman test result, and the number of observations considered for analysis, respectively.
Finally, ** and *** denote the statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, and values in parenthesis
indicate standard errors except for Hausman test where values in the parenthesis represent the probability value.

Variables
i*
i
er
y
Infla
Asst
Constant
Adj R2
F-stat
Hausman test
Observations

(1)
Pre-Crisis
(FE)

(2)
Post-Crisis
(FE)

-0.036
(0.039)
0.077
(0.074)
-3.037**
(1.459)
0.012
(0.03)
0.003
(0.026)
-0.252***
(0.041)
19.806***
(7.202)
0.050
16.549
21.805
(0.001)
576

-0.096***
(0.026)
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.295**
(0.126)
-0.024***
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.218***
(0.032)
7.001***
(0.892)
0.077
20.408
23.774
(0.001)
640

A. Robustness Check with GMM Method
Table 6 summarises the dynamic relationship between the variables analyzed with
the help of the GMM method. Our robustness check findings further confirm the
significant effect of international monetary policy on the risk-taking of the Indian
banks and corroborate with the findings from the earlier section.
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Table 6.
The Robustness Check Results
This table reports results obtained using the dynamic GMM approach. The dependent variable is Z-Scoreit. Other
variables considered in the model includes the following: lagged value of Z-score (Z-Scoreit-1), federal fund rate,
call money rate, exchange rate output, inflation, assets, and constant. The respective t-statistics are reported in the
parenthesis. The number of observations included in the model and the diagnostic test results such as Autocorrelation
(AR) and Sargan tests are reported in the subsequent rows in the above order. Finally, *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level.

Variables
Z-Scoreit-1
i^*
i
er
y
Infla
Asst
Constant
Number of observations
AR
Sargan test

Coefficient
0.553***
(83.670)
-0.022***
(-18.540)
0.015***
(17.460)
-0.477***
(-21.240)
0.011***
(13.910)
0.013***
(33.860)
-0.125***
(-27.370)
4.834***
(33.580)
1088
0.476 (0.713)
62.734 (1.000)

VI. CONCLUSION
The world witnessed the integration of economies in diverse fields over the past
couple of decades. As a result of this integration, events in these economies are also
intertwined. This scenario encouraged the policymakers to widen their decisionmaking information set by incorporating events in the foreign economies. One
such event is the foreign monetary policy and its impact. Thus, in this study, we
analyze the impact of international and domestic monetary policy on banks’ risktaking in India - one of the major emerging market economies. We employed
various panel data regression methodologies, such as fixed and random effect
models and GMM using annual data over the period 1999 to 2017. This study
finds that international monetary policy significantly impacts the risk-taking
of banks in India. Thus, while managing the banking sector’s riskiness in the
economy, policymakers should also consider the international monetary policy.
The risk that emerges from the global fund flows due to global monetary policy
conditions abroad should be observed for their potential to ignite bank risk-taking
in the economy. Simultaneously, evidence of the search for the yield channel of
the domestic policy rate is also stated. Our findings also establish a significant
role of the exchange rate in the banks’ risk-taking. Thus, the policy information set
for the stability of banks in the country should be enriched by incorporating both
international and domestic monetary policy and exchange rates in the economy.
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Appendix A: Selected Review of Related Papers
This table summarises the selected literature focusing on the impact of various factors on the risk-taking of banks.

Authors

Country of
Focus

Jiménez et al.
(2014)

Spain

Ramayandi et
al. (2014)

Hong Kong,
China, India,
Indonesia, the
Republic of
Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines,
Singapore,
Taipei, China,
and Thailand.
India

Gulati et al.
(2019)

Methodology and
Sample Period

Variables
of Interest

Maximum likely hood
GDP
Higher GDP growth reduces
estimation.
Short term
bank riskiness.
1984 Q4 - 2006 Q4
interest rate
Lower short-term interest
rates motivate banks
to soften their lending
standards and grant more
loans to borrowers with a
bad or no credit history.
Dynamic GMM
GDP
Higher GDP reduces the
Interest rate
overall risk of the bank.
2000 - 2011 and
2003 Q1 - 2011 Q4.
Z score
A low interest rate increases
risk-taking.

Two-step system
GMM.
1998 - 2013

GDP
Bank size

Chavan and
Gambacorta
(2019)

India

Dynamic GMM
2000 - 2004

GDP
NPL

Kearns and
Patel (2016)

44 countries:
22 advanced
economies and
22 EMEs.
Switzerland

ARDL
1990 Q1 - 2016 Q3

Exchange
Rate

Difference-indifferences estimation
2011 - 2016

Exchange
Rate

Dynamic system
GMM and OLS
Data from
2002 - 2015

Exchange
Rate

ARDL
1999 - 2013

Z-Score

Agarwal (2019)

Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2018)

Karim et al.
(2016)

China, Chinese
Taipei, Hong
Kong SAR,
India, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines,
Singapore and
Thailand.
Indonesia

Major Findings

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022

No significant relation
between credit risk and
economic activity.
Large Bank size increases the
probability of default.
An increase in GDP leads to
a decline in the NPL ratio.
Loan growth leads to
increase NPL.
Compare financial channel
and trade channel and find
that financial channel partly
offset the trade channel.
Appreciation leads to
increase in credit supply
by banks with net foreign
currency liability exposure.
Risk-taking channel of the
exchange rate in EMEs.
Appreciation leads to higher
risk-taking by firms with
higher forex debt.

GDP and inflation have a
positive impact on stability,
whereas interest rates have a
negative impact.
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Appendix A: Selected Review of Related Papers (Continued)
Authors
Niepmann
and SchmidtEisenlohr (2017)
Bourgain et al.
(2012)

Country of
Focus

Methodology and
Sample Period

Variables
of Interest

US

OLS logit and Probit
models.
2014Q4 - 2016Q2
OLS.
2005 - 2008.

Exchange
Rate

MENA region
and Turkey

Tchikand and
Tatiana (2016)

EU-17 economies

2SLS model
1999 - 2013

Hussain et al.
(2020)

China

Difference GMM
method.
2002 - 2012

Geng et al.
(2016)

China

Regression Fixed and
random effect
2001 - 2012

Bui and Bui
(2020)

42 emerging
markets

Luo et al. (2016)

140 countries

Ha and Quyen
(2018)

Vietnam

Panel smooth
transition regression
(PSTR)
2004 - 2014
Dynamic GMM and
ARDL
1999 - 2011
GMM methodology
2007 - 2016

Kasri and
Azzahra (2020)

Indonesia

Two-step systemGMM
September 2015 - June
2019

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/1
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v25i2

Major Findings

Depreciation will lead to a
reduction of lending in the
economy.
Z-Score
Large bank size leads to high
risk-taking.
Financial openness of
emerging countries
positively impacts risktaking.
Z-Score
Large bank size leads to high
risk-taking.
More individual bank
soundness leads to more
financial stability
Z-Score
Bank size, liquidity, and
Capitalization do not
significantly impact risktaking.
NonInterbank market rate and
central bank interest rates
performing
loans to
are positively correlated
with bank risk.
total loans
Bank level lending rate is
negatively correlated.
Banks with large assets
significantly contribute to
risk-taking.
Z-Score
Larger bank size leads to
Openness
more risk-taking.
Low level of openness
increases risk-taking.
Z-Score
Openness increases bank
Openness
risk through decreasing
profit efficiency.
Z-Score
Low interest rate leads to
bank risk-taking. Banks
with high market power
engage in less risk-taking
behavior even during the
loose monetary policy.
Liquidity credit level and
cost inefficiency increase
risk-taking. Bank size reduce
risk-taking
Z-Score
Exchange rate, financial
inclusion, asset returns, and
credit growth positively
influence stability. Interest
rates negatively affect
stability.
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